NATO and EU Enlargement and Globalisation Policies: Re-conceptualization of Security Priorities?

Assoc. Prof. Georgy Genov, Ph.D.
UNWE, Department of International Relations

Summary: NATO and the European Union (as a whole and every member-state included) have undertaken global commitments and responsibilities – to project and maintain security and stability, elsewhere, widely recognized by the international community. Recent or forthcoming developments provoke the question: what substantial changes, if any, occur or may occur vis-à-vis the established trends of enlargement and globalization achieved so far, and the correlation of European and global priorities on the agenda of the two powerful organizations and respective members. The focus is on the recent trends in the globalisation and enlargement policies of the two organisations.

The purpose of this article is to provoke a further debate about possible implications for a small country’s alliance and security politics as a consequence of alliance membership as: Lisbon Treaty and CSDP, Wider Black Sea, enlargement; reforms of NATO, a new strategic concept, increased burden-sharing and missions out-of area.

This paper also offers a short survey of the ongoing debate about the improvement of security architecture, the EU-NATO-Russia strategic relations – with certain implications related to energy security, global and regional security cooperation, and to individual member-states national and bi-lateral policies.

Key words: European Union, NATO, security, globalization, enlargement, strategic concept, indivisibility of security, policies.

JEL: D74, H41, H87.

NATO and the European Union have undertaken global commitments and responsibilities – mostly individually, through joint actions and in partnerships, inter alias under the aegis of international institutions. Their global competences and roles though not coinciding in certain spheres and particular cases are widely recognized by the international community. Both organizations have proclaimed as their headline goals global roles and global responsibilities to project and maintain security and stability, elsewhere.

Recent or forthcoming developments, namely USA new presidential administration and changes in its approaches to the world, the global financial crisis and the concerted efforts to overcome its consequences (G-20), new European Commission and the Lisbon Treaty of
the enlarged Union, the 2010 deadline for the headline goal for CFSP/ESDP (Petersberg tasks), the elaboration of a new Strategic Concept of NATO, and propositions and dialogue about possible restructuring of the European security architecture (draft European Security Treaty and the Corfu process) – provoke the question: what substantial changes, if any, occur or may occur vis-à-vis the established trends of enlargement and globalization achieved so far, and the correlation of European and global priorities on the agenda of the two powerful organizations.

Bulgaria is a member country of NATO and EU and this is a constant and dominant determinant of its foreign security and economic policy orientation, approaches and consequent engagements (hardly individual as a matter of choice). Correspondingly EU and NATO developments and policies will structure future policies and further external relations. What are or will be the main changes in the relevant strategic and institutional milieu of the allied countries, especially such as Bulgaria and its neighbours in the region? The purpose of this article is to provoke a debate about possible implications for a small country’s alliance and security politics.

The European Union: enlargement for globalisation

It is generally accepted that the process of globalization develops and manifests itself mainly as processes of regionalization – states as dominant actors, inter-governmental cooperation and international/regional organizations. Vis-à-vis the world economy it is again the regulative role of states (via WTO or G-20, not the least) and their policies, some states before all of course, international inter-governmental organizations as the European Union; the transnational corporations considered broadly as being subjected to states’ or international regulations (on the eve of G-20 meeting in London, 2009, Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy called for a global Economic security council in the United Nations and an Economic sustainability charter).

With the Lisbon Treaty in force the European Union will proceed in business-as-usual manner with the revised enlargement policy to be completed by 2015 with the certain accession of Croatia and Iceland, and possibly some other or the rest of the applicant states in the Western Balkans, including Turkey, maybe – the optimistic scenario. Enlargement will also bring with it new neighbours, extended borders with Russia, Ukraine, the Black Sea – bringing it closer to the Caucasus and Central Asia: “...the Commission has made it a strategic objective to promote a ring of well governed countries to the east of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean”. As President Baroso on the eve of his second term stated “Europe has a particular responsibility to promote freedom, stability and prosperity.


in its neighbourhood. We have entered into commitments towards candidate countries that seek to join the EU³.

It is evident that the situation with enlargement after the global financial crisis is complicated – the organization invents more and more new criteria and barriers for the candidates (that’s the way they perceive the situation); prevailing opinion is that the Union cannot merge with new members without considerable detriment for itself. And not the least a shift in the weight or priorities is evident – a successful exit from the crisis, competitiveness, cohesion and development (“European Economic Recovery Programme/Europe 2020”). Enlargement has often been called as the Union’s main foreign policy tool but it has its limits: enlargement can not proceed steadfast or forever and “enlargement fatigue” seems natural. Nevertheless it is a sound logic: an enlarged Union is a stronger Union and consequently stronger NATO partner – “as the EU gradually assumes a more global role, the NATO-EU and U.S.-EU relationships are likely to become more significant. NATO remains vitally important, but it will increasingly need to share centre stage with other organizations, particularly the EU.”⁴ Some of the would-be member states of EU are already NATO members. Others are applying and preparing themselves for NATO membership and responsibilities. The enlargements of EU and of NATO with the Balkan countries are two mutually complementary processes. No doubt in the midterm all countries situated in the Balkans will be somehow integrated in the United Europe (EU) – an area of security, justice and rule of law, and prosperity (initially optional).

By its very existence and as a result of its Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), the EU main aim is to create a unified, peaceful and prosperous Europe (“Europe whole and free and at peace”). European Security and Defence Policy/ESDP is a new policy area with its growing centrality for the Union’s external/foreign policy. In 2010 we shall see whether there will be any true and effective ESDP (Common Security and Defence Policy/CSDP as it is spelled in the Lisbon Treaty) to meet the global threats of twenty-first century (the ambition of a global but soft power, yet). Certainly the Union will continue to “go East” with its Neighbourhood (Wider Europe), Black Sea Synergy and Wider Black Sea policies and ventures thus in fact by reaching to the borders of the Broader/Greater Middle East. Further East the Union is engaged in a developing network for cooperation with countries from East Asia, e.g. ASEM, and negotiating free trade agreements. One may not expect so many new transformations to take place; however, certain changes are proceeding. The Union or at least the Directoire countries pledge for enhanced military cooperation. President Sarkozy argues that an EU defensive bloc of initially the six biggest member states would be beneficial both to the US and EU (under the Lisbon Treaty single member states don’t have the power to veto such a move)⁵. As they favour stronger trans-Atlantic ties certainly the US will lend a decisive support for a strong and more independent European military, for a permanent structured cooperation within CSDP. And a strengthened and effective ESDP will complement NATO mission and enterprises (“a NATO-EU family”).

The Lisbon Treaty retains virtually all the CFSP/ESDP-relevant provisions of the Constitutional

⁴ Revitalizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership: An Agenda for Action, p. 43.
Treaty: the creation of the double-hatted High Representative, also appointed by the European Council (with the agreement of the President of the Commission); the establishment of the new Foreign Affairs Council, separate from the General Affairs Council; the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), set to work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states, and comprising officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the member states; the adoption of a single legislative procedure, the Council’s European decision – overcoming the distinction between common positions, joint actions, and common strategies; the expansion of the scope of ESDP/CSDP, and of its missions (new art. 27 and 28); the creation of a new start up fund for CSDP operations (art. 28)⁶.

No doubt, the Lisbon Treaty offers opportunities for greater policy coherence, effectiveness and visibility of the external policies of the Union: a greater potential for a joined-up common European foreign, security and defence policy; a good legal and political basis for achieving that and giving the Union the “politics of scale” that would permit it to play a more active international role – commensurate to its stated global ambitions. Probably the most impressive change, signalling the Union as a defence organization is the expansion of the scope of CSDP, and of its missions (new art. 27 and 28), including: a solidarity clause and a mutual defence commitment, both with substantial qualifications and provisions; the possibility for the Council to entrust the implementation of a task to a group of member states which are willing and have the necessary capability (new art. 29); and the possible establishment of permanent structured cooperation in the field of defence (new art. 31 plus the relevant Protocol)⁷. In the domain of CSDP a crucial testing ground to this effect is to be the civilian crisis management, both for the growing importance that it is taking in the Union’s external action and for its lying at the juncture between different (so far separate) spheres of competence and activity. Still the provisions of the Treaty retain and strengthen the fundamentally intergovernmental character of CFSP and especially CSDP at the same time providing a strong impulse towards a more coherent approach and actions.

The European Union is going through a self-globalization process. “I am convinced, stressed President Baroso, that Europe can, and should, together with our partners, provide globalisation with the leadership it needs”. Further he claims for opening a new era for Global Europe: “The world today offers Europe an unprecedented opportunity to shape events ... The Lisbon Treaty ... will give us the tools to open up a new era in the projection of European interests worldwide. ... The Commission, as the driver of so many key external policies, plays its full part in seizing the moment to give Europe the weight it deserves on the global stage.”⁸

However, this process is taking place not only within the world economy but world politics as well. As a consequence single member states of the Union through participation in CFSP, CSDP etc. face or undertake more outside/extra-Union or globalized foreign and security policy vision and approaches (engagements and responsibilities).

Noteworthy is that the United States “welcomes and supports the creation of an EU capable of assuming a more global role... we very much want and need European support in dealing with emergent and actual threats, challenges, problems, and possibilities beyond the North Atlantic area. ...”9 Consequently Washington will “support the development of a strategically capable ESDP that can by 2020 project power and stability well beyond Europe’s borders and that can act autonomously, especially in crises where the United States does not wish to get involved, while at the same time turning civil-military security aspirations into reality.”10

We may conclude that the Union will proceed with the efforts to efficiently combine or supplement its introvert priorities (the success story of the European model), transatlantic security agenda and global aspirations; the prospects seem fairly realistic. In particular the Balkan member states of EU initially perceiving the “in” as a safe harbour in an unstable and insecure world have to manage in the troubled waters out of the relevant area or of global geopolitics. Consequently their external policies are and will be more globalized and securitized (naturally the Union perceives the region as a platzdarm for its eastern and global policies).

**NATO: Global Power on the move and Eurasian concerns**

Concerning the security and defence posture of the region of Europe, the United States is and will be a dominant actor. As might have been expected there are no substantial changes in the US approaches and priorities in NATO engagements and policies in the region or elsewhere. So the enlargement of the Alliance will go on. “The summit (April 2009) marked the renewal of US leadership of the Alliance... President Obama said in Strasbourg: We must renew our institutions, our alliances.”11 Specifically needed is “a new architecture founded on a strong U.S. involvement in NATO, NATO-EU relations aimed at promoting and projecting effective civil-military security beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.”12

What are the ongoing developments in NATO policies? As former Secretary General Manfred Woerner formulated the dilemma – after the Cold War NATO has to choose between going “out of area or out of business”. The strategic choice made is clearly stated: “NATO is taking important steps to complete its transformation from a static, reactive Alliance focused on territorial defence to an expeditionary, proactive one ... The Alliance is overcoming ... a Cold War-era stereotype understanding of its role, thereby eliminating self-imposed limits that directly reduce the security of...”

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10 Revitalizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership: An Agenda for Action, p. 15.
its members and partners, both individually and collectively.”

Correspondingly at the summit in Bucharest then US President George W. Bush in his address offered a re-definition of the Alliance and its mission: “It is no longer a static Alliance focused on defending Europe ... It is now an expeditionary Alliance that is sending its forces across the world ...”

Without much ado the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is really going global. The Alliance has recognized that the best defence against remote threats is to treat them at their locality – a forwarded defence strategy – the Alliance bodies and states have increasingly recognized the necessity for acting at long distances from Europe. So NATO’s proposed move is to lend membership or a kind of membership to any (?) democratic state in the world – ready, willing and able to contribute to the fulfilment of NATO’s new responsibilities and mission. Decisions taken at NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit aimed at enhancing NATO’s partnerships with the states of Central Asia and extending the partnership concept to the Greater Middle East reflected a conviction that the Allies’ own security would now hinge upon a concerted effort to project stability beyond the borders of Europe.

In addition to its formal partnerships (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) NATO does cooperate with a cluster of countries that are not part of these structures. Referred to as Contact Countries they typically share similar strategic concerns and key Alliance values.

Partners are not the same as allies,” wrote Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, and even “structured dialogue” is not the same as multinational planning, exercises, and operations. NATO leaders perceive these global partnerships not as an end but as a first step toward formal membership. They will prepare the Alliance to transform itself from a transatlantic into a global entity. NATO states need only to decide that membership should in principle be open to non-European countries. “Broadening membership is preferable to creating ad hoc coalitions.” A commitment to shared values should be a more relevant determinant of membership than geography Indeed, the Alliance has transformed from a Cold-War era defensive Alliance to an

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14 In a critical commentary published by the IISS is noted that “this is the ever-expanding NATO the United States wants.” – http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/april-2008/nato-expansion-is-bush-pipedream, p. 1. Cf. “In order to provide security for NATO, it is important that one tackles those challenges and threats, if necessary, at the source, which means that NATO will have to operate beyond the territorial confines of the North Atlantic Treaty. And it does...”, NATO is an actor in a globalized world. And NATO will be involved as an actor in that globalized world, .... Briefing by Ambassador Daalder on the Future of NATO, 2010-02-23 – http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=D04A503-5925-4292-8040-69-A8CEDD1828, p. 3.

15 NATO has established partner relationships with over 20 countries in Europe and Eurasia, seven in North Africa and the Middle East, four in the Persian Gulf, and has global partners such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore, which are working with NATO in Afghanistan. Cf. Fried, Daniel, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. 2008. NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC March 11, 2008. -http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2008/FriedTestimony080311 p.pdf, p. 3.

16 “Only a truly global Alliance can address the challenges of the day”. – Daalder, Ivo and James Goldgeier, Global NATO.

17 The Allies established a set of general guidelines on relations with Contact Countries in 1998, which do not allow yet for a formal institutionalization of relations, but reflect the Allies’ desire to increase cooperation. The term Contact Countries was agreed by the Allies in 2004.

18 To make future enlargement possible, NATO will have to take some intermediate steps – the proposed global partnership, the establishment of formal military liaisons between partner countries and the SHAPE (Mons, Belgium), and the establishment of a NATO Global Partnership Council (similar to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). Cf. Daalder and Goldgeier, Op. cit., p. 106-107.
active “out of area” security organization, political and based on common values. Most probably a new Strategic concept is necessary (and will follow) which will serve three functions:

- to establish and specify a joint approach on globalist peacemaking between Europe and the North American states;
- clearly to state that NATO’s prime function is military operations;
- and to serve a public diplomacy role.

In the specific debates five possible visions for NATO’s New Strategic Concept are articulated:

- “Article 5 vision”: NATO clings to its original purpose of defending against territorial attack – an increasingly unrealistic vision in terms of both international political realities and NATO’s recent operational past;
- “Peacekeeping vision” goes beyond Article 5 – NATO acts as a peacekeeping force, but definitely not a peace-making one, and has no mandate of its own;
- “Global Alliance” is the most ambitious plan, in which NATO forms part of a global interlinked network of democratic states;
- “Status Quo Plus” entails working NATO into any new or emerging areas of security: energy, homeland, counter-terrorism etc. – with the advantages of broad scope and responsiveness to contemporary concerns, but certainly too wide and too unfocused;
- “NATO as Peacemaker” vision has the right combination of imagination, focus, and pragmatism, and envisages NATO as a provider of collective military solutions (this has the advantages of the peacekeeping vision, but goes beyond that to look at making peace as well as keeping it, and it has the extra-European dimension that the global Alliance concept proposes, but has a tighter focus on military affairs).

To be sure enlarged NATO will not undermine the UN which has not the kind of military and operational capacity that NATO possesses. The Alliance even enlarged is not conceived to become a substitute or another UN. As analysts foresee NATO if necessary probably may establish itself as a capable and legitimate adjunct to the UN – by helping to implement and enforce its decisions. Or if, as in the case of Kosovo in 1999 and 2008, when the UN is unwilling to authorize action against a threat to international peace and security, NATO countries might have to act anyway. NATO’s global partnerships reflected the “transition from a geographical approach towards a functional approach to security.”

What NATO needs to do before its summit in Lisbon (2010) is the drafting of a new NATO Strategic Concept, to replace the one agreed to at the 1999 Washington Summit and supplemented at Prague (2002), Riga (2006) and Strasbourg-Kehl (2009). It will not be a document binding on the allies; many of its propositions will be about what allies would like to do in common or simply diplomatic compromises that might or might not be accepted by all the members of the Alliance (the most effective elements of a Strategic Concept generally are those which codify what the Alliance is already doing). What might be the priorities on the NATO Agenda:

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an agreed recognition and mutual commitment, expressed both in general terms and in specific actions to be taken, to be engaged in some areas outside of Europe;  
- a significant effort to reinvigorate the NATO-Russia Council, to the extent that the Russian Federation is also ready to play its part;  
- emphasis on the capabilities of individual allies and of the Alliance as a whole to undertake successfully all operations to which it commits itself.

Increasingly situations in which the Alliance is most likely to become engaged include a heavy premium on non-military efforts. There is a debate, however, whether NATO should seek to create all the needed non-military capabilities within the Alliance itself or to draw upon the capacity and the expertise either of individual nations or of other institutions including the United Nations, the World Bank, and especially the European Union – to provide the bulk of non-military instruments and activities. (The EU is facing the same dilemma developing own hard power capacity. In personal interviews with senior officers in Mons, December 2009, the author could not but conclude that the option for NATO to develop own soft power capacities is not excluded yet.)

The Balkans have several success stories for NATO and EU and they will continue to be a major theatre of operations for NATO (as an example – KFOR or patrolling Kosovo – to prevent Serbia from intervening, and conflict), and EU enlargement engagements. Certainly the Alliance will benefit from the membership of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, etc. In terms of the anti-terrorism campaign, these countries emerge as beneficial. Based purely on vulnerability calculations, the impact of enlargement on the defensibility of NATO’s borders would be positive if Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia joined the Alliance. More important result will be the astricution of political and security space in South-Eastern Europe with a temporary enclave of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo. The impact of enlargement on Alliance cohesion if to some degree negative, to be pessimistic – the argument that more members will make the decision process even more complex, will be again balanced by the sound similarity of the European NATO members’ views on security, and their membership in an increasingly unified and integrated EU.

The EU and NATO: going East

As NATO and the EU “go global” and “go east” concentration and priorities to a certain extent divide into two directions:

- West or the Western Balkans, where the ultimate task is peace, tranquillity, democracy attained by membership (“everybody in”). NATO members’ interests in this region require stable, reform-capable states, in control of their own

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23 “...a clear perception that, when NATO does agree to become engaged in a mission, all the allies are prepared, in some politically-significant measure, to share risks and burdens”. Ibid, pp. 7-8.
24 “... political will ... to become a full participant in the future, not just of European security but of other major areas of potential cooperation, extending into places like the Middle East, Central and Southwest Asia, as well as into functional areas that include energy, the environment, and climate change”. Hunter, Robert E. Op. cit. pp. 7-8; “a real interest by this Administration and indeed by NATO to foster a cooperative relationship with Russia that is aimed at producing concrete results. Briefing by Ambassador Daalder on the Future of NATO, 2010-02-23, p. 2.
25 Ibidem. “... security today isn’t just a purely military task. It requires improved civil-military capabilities and integration and enhanced NATO capacity for civilian deployments”; “… we need a civilian capacity as well as a military capacity.” Briefing by Ambassador Daalder on the Future of NATO, 2010-02-23, pp. 2, 3.
borders, safe from external military or economic pressures or externally inspired secessions;
• **East**, the merger of the Balkans with or into the Black Sea region – further enlargement\(^\text{27}\).

Both the Balkans and the Black Sea region are characterized by a lot of common risks and challenges, including fragile statehood, a history of violent conflicts, unfinished or unconsolidated democratization, and uneven economic distribution or underdevelopment\(^\text{28}\).

Given their key geopolitical position (direct neighbours to the EU, NATO, and Russia; a bridge to the Middle East and Central Asia; an increasingly important energy transport route) instability in either region can have significant ramifications for domestic, regional, and international security to the extent to project instability into the heart of the Euro-Atlantic community. Instead of appearing as a point on the periphery of the European landmass, it now stands like a core component of the **West’s strategic hinterland**\(^\text{29}\). NATO has an important role to play in promoting stability in the Black Sea region. Three countries bordering the Black Sea – Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria – are Alliance members. Their role is set to grow further\(^\text{30}\).

The broader Black Sea region is the new frontier in the advance of Euro-Atlantic security and democracy. A range of developments over the past few years has attracted increasing attention to the emergence of the Wider Black Sea Region as a new hub of European security\(^\text{31}\). In combination they have contributed to the Wider Black Sea region to be accepted and treated as an important component of European security. These developments have also made a range of issues connected to the Wider Black Sea Region central to the security of single and all EU member states, as they have brought a wide array of traditional and non-traditional security concerns\(^\text{32}\).

The specific Union’s interests in the region can broadly be defined along four categories: promoting long-term stability and conflict management; promotion of democratic institutions and the rule of law; securing a stable energy supply for Europe; and combating organized crime and terrorism, including concerns over migration and border controls\(^\text{33}\).

NATO’s 2002 Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism prescribes actions to reduce vulnerabilities to an attack and to control the effects if such occurs, to counter terrorism by offensive military action, and to promote military cooperation with specific focus on the Black Sea region. Turning the broader Black Sea region into a policy priority need not compete with the priorities assigned to other areas – stabilization of this region would entail incomparably lower risks and incomparably smaller resources compared to the risks and resource commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, or emergent threats and initiatives in the broader Middle East.

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\(^{27}\) At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 Albania and Croatia were invited to begin accession talks with NATO. Allied leaders also agreed to invite FYR of Macedonia as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name is reached with Greece. Intensified Dialogues were also offered to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.


\(^{30}\) Bucharest Summit Declaration, pt. 36.


\(^{33}\) Cf. http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm
European/EuroAtlantic security as Eurasian: debating a new security architecture

Special attention deserves the closer cooperation between NATO and EU – an area of NATO activity that most needs to be developed – a complementary relationship with the Union, especially its CFSP and CSDP. President Obama went to Prague for the annual summit with the European Union leadership signalling the importance of working with the Union in helping to meet common problems. A key to success for the future of the Alliance is “a common understanding that we are all in this together – the “all for one and one for all” principle extends to “out of area” operations.”34 The future of the transatlantic relationship in terms of security cooperation is much broader, and forthcoming agreement will help to bridge differences of perspective and interests within NATO that must extend beyond NATO and beyond classic security issues.35

One of the focal points of such an agreement is the renewed debate nominally about the indivisibility of European security. This principle is proclaimed and implemented both on a European level (in the OSCE framework) and within regional organizations (e.g. in NATO documents) as highlighted most recently in U.S. Secretary of State H. Clinton’s speech in Paris. While in the OSCE the principle of indivisible security is a political commitment, in NATO the same principle has legal force with no veto right for third countries.

The argument is that for the years passed new States have emerged and others have disappeared, new groupings have formed and enlarged, and others have vanished – i.e. Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security has changed radically since 1975. Traditional security challenges have changed and evolved – new responses and tools have been developed. The understanding expressed in the 1990 Paris Charter was that Euro-Atlantic security was perceived as all States as parts of a single system. So “comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security” was to imply increasingly close cooperation, including through joint decision-making and joint action against commonly defined problems. As a consequence some states, notably Russia, assume that security in the Euro-Atlantic area after the end of the Cold War failed to meet its initial promise. Specifically, some questioned whether the enlargement of NATO and the EU were compatible with the principle of indivisible security (others, mainly states directly involved in these processes, viewed them as corresponding to it); reasons as the difficulties of political transformation in parts of the OSCE area appreciated, the accent is on the “rise of challenges to basic principles of state behaviour and interaction”. According to certain views the greatest obstacle to a single, indivisible security space in the OSCE region is “an increasing divergence in the adherence to basic standards of democratic governance and respect for human rights.”36. In this view, indivisible security was not being respected in the Euro-Atlantic area. The OSCE space was becoming fragmented. States were seen to have access to unequal levels of security.

At a time when divergent views have arisen on the state and prospects of Euro-Atlantic security only through constant discussion can they remain relevant and be reaffirmed by the Euro-Atlantic and

36 The project of comprehensive security, some parties argue, “was not balanced between the Dimensions”. In addition the OSCE role in building co-operative security, including on the basis of the 1999 Platform for Co-operative Security, “never got off the ground”.

38 Economic Alternatives, issue 1, 2010
Eurasian community. The OSCE community needs an open and ambitious dialogue to rebuild trust, to reaffirm commitments to basic principles, and to restore the basis for common purpose. Security in Europe and the security of Europe need this. The OSCE is an existing and natural forum for this dialogue and it was the first to respond to the Russian and French Presidents’ calls for a renewed dialogue on basic questions of European Security. This dialogue started in 2008; in 2009 at OSCE Athens Ministerial Council meeting of participating States adopted a declaration and a decision on the Corfu Process, which provides strong impetus for a new, OSCE-anchored dialogue on the future of European security.

The concept of indivisibility of security is part of a package, along with comprehensive and co-operative security (“trinity of concepts”), and these concepts are organic and have proven adaptable over time – despite dramatic change and challenge. In the broad and largely accepted CSCE context:

- indivisible security means that the security of each state is inextricably linked with the security of every other state (co-operation is beneficial to all participating States, while the insecurity in or of one participating State can affect the well-being of all);
- comprehensive security approach to security – three dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental and the human dimensions viewed as complementary, interconnected and interdependent (all three dimensions have been understood as equally essential to real, long-term security);
- co-operative security emphasises the importance of OSCE co-operation with each other, with other international organisations and institutions, and with the OSCE’s Partners for Co-operation.

The prevailing attitudes are that progress in five areas, crucial for European/Eurasian security architecture (hard and soft), seem sufficiently realistic:

- goal-oriented discussions on the role of arms control and confidence building measures instruments;
- better cooperation among all security organizations and actors in Euro-Atlantic area;
- elaboration of common approaches to global threats to security of citizens, societies and states;
- common set of guiding rules to be uniformly applied to settle all crisis situations, including the frozen conflicts;
- common security agenda.

Washington responded that the indivisibility of security should be the basis for discussions on European security. “We agree that this is an important concept, and it is one which the United States fully supports... What we mean by this term, which is found in such important foundational documents as the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the Rome Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation:

- comprehensive nature of security as embodied in the three dimensions of the OSCE: human, economic, and political-military;

• indivisibility of security among states – all states have a right to freely choose their own alliances, and no state should be allowed a “sphere of privileged interests”;
• recognition that the security of Europe and Eurasia is inextricably bound up with global security;
• appreciation that security within states impacts security among states.

Defined in this context, then, we fully share the view that security in Europe is indeed indivisible.”

Central to the agreement should be that no state should ensure its own security at the expense of others. “It emphasizes the development of mechanisms of collective coordination for conflict prevention and settlement … and provides principles to be applied uniformly to all crisis situations… correspondingly negotiations on a European Security Treaty should be launched by a meeting of heads of state and heads of intergovernmental organisations operating in the field of the Euro-Atlantic security, i.e. OSCE, NATO, EU, CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). This could take place in the framework of the Platform for Cooperative Security (OSCE) and the Treaty should focus on politico-military security and ways for a more structured dialogue will be explored while the participating states see no alternative to the restoration of the concept of indivisible, co-operative and comprehensive security.”

In regard to the proposals made by President Medvedev about the new security treaty in Europe, “…there were ideas about new mechanisms, but United States remains committed to the old mechanisms still … we remain committed to the mechanisms that have proven to work. NATO, the OSCE, the NATO-Russia Council are all mechanisms that we believe fulfill the needs of security that we need to… as the Secretary (H. Clinton) said in her speech, we welcome the proposals. We think there are promising and interesting elements in them. We do not believe we need another legally binding treaty. And we do believe that existing formats – the NATO-Russia Council and the OSCE – are the right places to have these discussions.”

The principles of indivisible, comprehensive and co-operative security have been reaffirmed by the participating States: The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe declared that “security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others”; The Charter for European Security, agreed in 1999 in Istanbul, was designed expressly to contribute to the formation of a common and indivisible security space in the OSCE area, free of dividing lines and with comparable levels of security for all, further, § 8 of the Istanbul Charter affirms that States will not strengthen their security at the expense of other States, and that every State has an equal right to security; The 2003 Maastricht Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century declared that the OSCE “multidimensional concept of common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security” was well-suited to tackle the security challenges of the new century.

The OSCE is 53 member-states (Eurasia, North America) regional collective security organization responsible for security issues between its members.

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43 Ibid, p. 2.
It consists of a set of political commitments although legally binding treaties exist within its framework, e.g. the CFE Treaty. NATO, on the contrary, is originally a collective defence organisation consisting of allies who are prepared to defend each other against an outside threat. The EU, through the Lisbon Treaty, also covers its members with a legally binding defence clause. Moreover, the main principles of collective security are already included in a legally binding document – the Charter of the United Nations.44

Conclusion

The European Union seems to be over-globalised in terms of vulnerability to external processes. Correspondingly the Union will concentrate on international cooperation in global economic regulation and the build-up of safe-guard capacities. Noteworthy is the renewal of international/global – as external – economic security approaches and considering, and at national level among the member-states as well.

The Union has to adjust to and arrange a smooth implementation of the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. The pace of enlargement of EU-29 will be slowed, if not postponed for the mid-term. Instead Neighbourhood, Black Sea Synergy, Wider Black Sea policies will receive higher priority.

Although certain pre-occupation with socio-economic stability, development and cohesion the Union will proceed with its active CFSP and CSDP in close cooperation with NATO, but with the UN and OSCE also.

NATO is steadily evolving from democracy defending to democracy promoting and defending (out of area) against new and global threats; promoting cooperation and stability ensures security for its member states, national and regional. The organization, the community and every single member state are widening the scope, substance and complexity of joint and unilateral engagements and activities. Increasing intra-NATO interdependence is discernible.

Any new member state faces increasing in scope and complexity external problems to be solved, which complicate internal policies and public support mobilization (Governments till now, even if willing, are not successful in the mobilization of wide social and political support for membership responsibilities.)

The Alliance will retain its hard security predominance and priorities. As the United States has offered its new approach to missile defense as its U.S.-funded contribution to a NATO system, “we hope that by Lisbon (Fall 2010), the entire alliance will embrace this as a mission.” 45 Global responsibilities, new strategic concept and reform of NATO engraves the importance of the task for any single member-state for participation and burden-sharing (at least defence budgets and procurement): “...we need more money... We will raise the ceiling and countries will have to contribute to that.” 46

NATO enlargement in the Balkans, to be completed by 2015, is perceived, contemplated and effectuated as a part of its policy of outreach through partnership, dialogue and cooperation – across the globe. So it is to be considered in a wider context. The evolution of NATO as...
expansion in the Balkans spells constant change not the least within the region and bi-, tri- and multilateral relations. There is a possibility that specific controversies and problems may become somehow internalized or imported in NATO, which in turn calls for reforms.

The expected further enlargement of NATO membership in the region, uncontested, poses two sets of problems as a challenge to Alliance’ effectiveness, and to member states elites’ cognition capacity: gradual albeit slow move of new members to the understanding of the necessity of augmenting own membership’s utility – for their allies and Alliance’s casus foederis; the importance of responsibility for growing commitment to NATO mission and actions – the rationale of membership is participation and utility. And with the development of a New Strategic concept the new member-states have to adopt adequate and compatible national military doctrines: single country’s utility can be measured by the availability of correspondingly trained, equipped, compatible detachments to be deployed in joint multinational operations, anywhere (and to attain the coveted interoperability of its troops).

To sum up: NATO and EU will continue their strategic policy of integration in the world and global pre-occupation – no change in visions and missions; both organisations will further expand although with different resolution and pace; the Alliance and the Union will pay due attention to internal adjustment and better and more efficient functioning; all member states will be engaged in the implementation of policies and contemplation of anonymous agreement.