Behavioral Assumptions and the Level of Trust in Society as a Decisive Factor in the Existence of Strong Formal Institutions

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Abstract

In the article, the authors demonstrate through the prism of the empirical method of research that it is the behavioral assumptions of people and this or that level of trust in society that play a key role in the existence of effective formal institutions. The article discusses various aspects of behavioral assumptions, which sometimes cannot be explained by the concept of a "rational person". As such an example, the concept of "petty foul tactics" is discussed, as a kind of well-described in the literature phenomenon of opportunistic behavior. In the article, the authors analyzed the correlation of indicators, "petty foul tactics", the level of trust in society, and also identified seven behavioral stereotypes. The key conclusion that the authors of the article come to is that the well-being of a particular country depends on the ratio of people who adhere to certain stereotypes.

Keywords: behavioral assumptions, level of trust, institutions, rational behavior, opportunistic behavior

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1. Introduction

t has been scientifically proven that the well-being of countries is largely determined by the quality of institutions. So, for example, this thesis was substantiated by studies (Acemoglu et al., 2005) conducted by scientists from the school of new institutional economics.

Institutions are certainly important for the economic development. According to the scientist D. North, "institutions" are some rules of the game in society, as well as formal restrictions created by man, which correlate relationships between people (North, 1990). This kind of definition of institutions can be determined precisely by the behavioral assumptions (Wiliamson, 1985) of people, as well as their ability to negotiate among themselves and come to a common conclusion. As a result, those forms of institutions appear in society that contribute

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to the realization of the possibility of living together (Emmenegger, 2021).

In economic theory, the concept of "rational man" is generally used to analyze behavioral assumptions. The latter, in a scientific context, is based on the hypothesis of the infinite and continuous ability of a person to optimize personal income. According to Auzan, people are driven by a single result the thirst for profit (Auzan, 2014). At the same time, it is important that the optimization skill and the only goal setting is activated at the subconscious level. In scientific theory, one can find the thesis that all market participants without exception behave in a rational way. Therefore, the "rational person" models are worth mentioning, on the basis of which a number of theories can be derived based on very attractive mathematical models (Oliva, Zahn, 2021; Shi et al., 2021). At the same time, if we consider institutions in the context of socio-economic models in general in the thesis of "rational" behavior, the role of institutions is reduced to favorable conditions for increasing incomes for the maximum number of market participants. Scientists Singh and Gaur believe that the role of institutions is very diverse, and the possibility of their influence on various macroeconomic processes is very multifaceted (Singh and Gaur, 2021). Based on this, the theory of the new institutional economics uses the concepts of bounded rationality (Wheeler, 2018; De Clippel and Rozen, 2021) and opportunistic behavior (Cordes et al., 2011).

It is believed that the versatility of behavioral assumptions, as well as the level of willingness to compromise, are one of the fundamental criteria for the quality of institutions in the country. Human behavior is also important, or rather, that component Behavioral Assumptions and the Level of Trust in Society as a Decisive Factor in the Existence of Strong Formal Institutions

of it that cannot be effectively regulated by institutions (both formal and informal).

The object of the study is the relationship between the efficiency of institutions and the well-being of countries, and the subject of the study is the preferences of the individual, characterizing his behavioral characteristics. Our main task is to test the hypothesis that behavioral prerequisites and the level of trust in society affect the effectiveness of institutions. which in turn determine the well-being of countries. This study is based on a statistical analysis of data obtained from various sources. In particular, we apply methods of cluster and regression analysis. Variables that determine behavioral preconditions are based on surveys conducted in different countries. This is the main limitation of our study, since people's answers to questions about behavior in a given situation may not coincide with their behavior in a real situation.

2. Review of literature

The concept of "behavioral assumptions" is described in detail by Williamson (Wiliamson, 1993), where he points out that the assumption of rationality cannot be used to describe many economic patterns. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider other assumptions, in particular, opportunistic behavior. Subsequently, the term "behavioral assumptions" was used in various studies. The article (Gabix, 2020) discusses various behavioral assumptions for building the Keynesian model. Hommes (1921) studied the anticipated utility approach, which is based on the "behavioral assumption that beliefs are coming from a completed learning process". Safarzadeh and Rasti-Barzoki (Safarzadeh and Rasti-Barzoki, 2019) considered the impact of different behavioral assumptions on electricity market analysis.

Taking into account the possibility of non-acceptance of the concept of "rational person" in economic research, regardless of the context and use of the concept of opportunistic behavior, opens up prospects for new research.

Thus, the study of various accents of opportunistic behavior was the scientific focus of the works of Liolion et al. (2019), as well as Kabbach-de-Castro (2021). In a scientific article by Ouardighi and Shniderman (2019), in particular, opportunistic behavior is considered through the prism of contractual relations between suppliers and recipients of services and goods.

Nevertheless a promising aspect for the study of relevant aspects of the "accepted norms" of behavior is the commitment of citizens to the "petty foul tactics". This concept was carefully analyzed in the scientific work of Sargsyan and Gevorgyan (2019), in which the authors described one of the types of human behavior which is based on the principle of minor violations of the "rules of the game", most often adopted in a formal way (sometimes also informal norms of behavior), ensuring the implementation which is the most burdensome for society as a whole, based on unjustified transaction costs.

We believe that the behavior of a "petty foul" cannot be justified by the concept of a "rational person", since this type of human behavior cannot be rational precisely in the long term for the individual and society as a whole. We consider a "petty foul" behavior as an example of opportunistic behavior.

An important emphasis in the article by Sargsyan and Gevorgyan was indicated by the empirical method that it is precisely tolerance for "petty foul tactics", in the context of the peculiarities of the perception of institutions, as well as a low level of constitutional traditions, that leads to destructive prospects for the socio-economic development (Coyle, 2019).

Cruz-García and Peiró-Palomino (2019) are certainly right when they say that not only the accepted norms of behavior are important for building effective institutions, but also the willingness to compromise and/or the level of public trust in them. The very concept of "the level of trust in society" is very broad. This category also includes the level of people's trust in each other, as well as the level of trust in various formal and informal institutions (Camussi, Mancini, 2019). The level of trust, according to scientists, is largely formed by behavioral assumptions that are generally accepted in society.

Many scientific papers, as well as studies (Shafir, 2013; World Bank, 2015) devoted to the analysis of the influence of behavioral assumptions on decision-making under uncertainty, focus on managerial decisionmaking in the context of bounded rationality and the level of trust in society. Various scientists (Jones et al., 2013; Olejniczak et al., 2020) have previously shown that if behavioral assumptions are taken into account, this, in turn, significantly improves the quality of managerial decisions.

This article examined the interaction of the level of trust in society, behavioral assumptions (expressed in particular in the tendency to "petty foul tactics"), the specifics of institutions and the welfare of countries. In particular, a number of scientific papers (Alexiou et al., 2020; Zergawu et al., 2020) show the relationship between the quality of institutions and economic development. Thus, the purpose of this article is to substantiate the existence of the following chain of relationships: the behavioral preconditions of people \rightarrow the level of trust in society \rightarrow

the quality of institutions \rightarrow the welfare of countries. At the same time, we are not inclined to exclude the existence of other factors influencing human behavior with regard to the welfare of countries.

3. A data used

The following databases are used in this article:

- 1. Worldwide Value Survey (WVS for short)¹;
- Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI for short)²;
- United Nations Human Development Index (Human Development Index, abbreviated as HDI)³.

The first database is based on surveys of respondents in 56 countries (Phase 6 of

Behavioral Assumptions and the Level of Trust in Society as a Decisive Factor in the Existence of Strong Formal Institutions

the WVS surveys), the second and third base includes country estimates. We averaged the results of the WVS surveys by country and combined the three databases into one. The article also uses the results of the World Values Survey surveys by country, as well as the original data. Averaging uses the usual average for continuous variables. The variables V24_Most_People_Trust and V104_ Trust people know are factors with 2 and 4 possible answers, respectively (V24_Most_ People Trust: 1. "Most people can be trusted", 2. "Need to be very careful"; and V104_Trust_ people know: 1. "Trust completly", 2. "Trust somewhat", 3. "Do not trust very much", 4. "Do not trust at all").4 For these variables, the percentage of respondents who trust others fully or partially is calculated.

N	Title	Abbreviated name	Database	Minimum	Maximum	Average value	St. deviation
1	Justifiable: Avoiding a fare on public transport	V198_Claim_benef	WVS	1.39	4.40	2.5213	.77743
2	Justifiable: Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled	V199_fare_transp	WVS	1.34	4.51	2.6778	.80793
3	Justifiable: Stealing property	V200_Steal_proper	WVS	1.14	4.09	1.7188	.52956
4	Justifiable: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance	V201_Cheat_tax	WVS	1.27	4.12	2.1619	.62731
5	Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	V2002_bribe	WVS	1.19	4.14	1.8497	.57542
6	Most people can be trusted	V24_Most_People_Trust	WVS	0.03	0.67	0.2421	.16394
7	How much you trust: People you know personally?	V104_Trust_people_know	WVS	0.42	0.97	0.7598	.13159
8	Rule of Law	WB_WGI_Rule_Law	WGI	-1.46	2.04	0.1552	.97959
9	Human Development Index	HDI	HDI	.348	.935	.75520	.125571

Table 1. A data used

1 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org

² https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators

³ http://hdr.undp.org/

⁴ V24_Most_People_Trust: 1. "Most people can be trusted", 2. "Need to be very careful"; and V104_Trust_people_know: 1. "Trust completly", 2. "Trust somewhat", 3. "Do not trust very much", 4. "Do not trust at all".

It is important to detail that Table 1 provides information about the variables used in this scientific article. Descriptive statistics are given for country-averaged indicators.

4. Results

4.1. The relationship between behavioral assumptions and the level of trust in society

Is it possible to trust a rational person? In this matter, we should not forget about the relationship between behavioral assumptions and the level of trust in society.

If we ask ourselves the question of the influence of people's behavioral assumptions on the level of trust in society, then the answer to this question is quite unambiguous, since we believe that behavioral assumptions affect the level of trust in society.

The concept of a "rational person" does not assume the existence of other people as a whole. The interaction of people in this concept is based on the fact that each person pursues the goal of profit and cooperating with each other only because it can provide an increase in joint income. If we proceed from such an interpretation of cooperation, the category of trust cannot exist at all, due to the fact that certain changes in the context leading to the need to create a new "more rational" relationship will make possible the disorganization of existing ties. At the same time, a "rational person" is a "predictable person" who makes optimal decisions that can best be described through the prism of game theory.

In this study, we proceeded from the fact that people's behavior as such is not always rational and is committed to "petty foul tactics", which we consider as a kind of "opportunistic behavior". To empirically measure the level of people's commitment to "petty foul tactics", the country-averaged values of the first five variables from Table 1 were used.

It is important to point out that the answers to abstract questions about people's behavior are usually mixed due to the fact that people tend to answer them "correctly". These responses may differ significantly from the behavior in real situations. Nevertheless, we will assume that the average level of mixing across countries is approximately the same. Respondents answered the first five questions from Table 1 on a ten-point scale, in which 1 corresponded to the answer "such behavior is never justified" and 10 - "always justified".

It should be noted that Figure 1 shows the relationship between respondents' trust in familiar people and variables describing the behavioral assumptions of people by country.

From Figure 1, we can draw a preliminary conclusion that the higher the tolerance of people to "petty foul tactics", the lower the average level of trust in a particular society. We found out that in all five variables that we studied there were behavioral assumptions of people. Tellingly, in a society where such violations are not listed as "unacceptable", the level of trust is much lower. This thesis is also confirmed by Figure 2, which shows the relationship of the same five variables characterizing the behavioral assumptions of people with a level of trust in relation to all people, regardless of whether the respondent personally knows them or not.

Figure 2 illustrates that a high tolerance for "petty foul tactics" leads to a low level of trust in society. The only exception is the issue of tolerance for tax evasion. In this case, it should be noted that the inverse relationship is explained by the wording of the question and possible answers in the variable V24_ Most_People_Trust. The negative answer



Behavioral Assumptions and the Level of Trust in Society

Figure 1. The relationship between people's behavioral assumptions and the level of trust in acquaintances by country



Figure 2. The relationship between people's behavioral assumptions and the level of trust in all people by country.



Figure 3. Relationships between the variables under study

to this question⁵ – "one must be careful" does not completely exclude the possibility of trust, or otherwise, one can trust and still be careful. This formulation of the question leads to the fact that the variable V24 Most People Trust carries much more "noise" than the variable V104_Trust_people_know. Despite this disadvantage of the V24 Most People_Trust variable, its comparison with characterizing other questions people's behavioral assumptions leads to the same results as when comparing with the V104 Trust people know variable shown in Figure 1. These results empirically confirm that the influence of behavioral assumptions on the level of trust in society is one of the most important assumptions for the existence of strong institutions in a particular country.

4.2. Institutions and the level of trust in society

If we talk about stable formal institutions, it is better to create the latter on the basis of the behavioral assumptions of a particular society. This can be evidenced by the numerous failures of attempts to artificially export institutions. At the same time, formal institutions themselves, in the context of long-term prospects, can form behavioral assumptions. All these complex relationships are schematically depicted in Figure 3.

As a preliminary conclusion, we formulate the following hypothesis: behavioral assumptions and the level of trust in society are relevant assumptions for the formation of formal institutions.

To empirically test this hypothesis, we used a conventional linear regression model in which the dependent variable is the level of development of institutions, which we measured using the Rule of Low variable (see Table 1). Explanatory variables are those that characterize behavioral assumptions and the level of trust in society. These variables are listed in the first seven rows of Table 1.

There may be a fairly high degree of correlation between the five variables

⁵ These tables are given in the SPSS econometric package format.

characterizing behavioral assumptions and the two variables characterizing the level of trust in society. In addition, there is also a correlation between two groups of variables. All these correlations can make possible the problem of multicollinearity in the model under consideration. To solve this problem, a step-by-step variable selection procedure was used, which is based on the method of sequential removal (backward) of variables with multicollinearity control at each step. As a result of using such a model specification algorithm, the resulting final equation does not have a multicollinearity problem. The main results of the application of this model are shown in Tables 2 and 3.

Behavioral Assumptions and the Level of Trust in Society as a Decisive Factor in the Existence of Strong Formal Institutions

The coefficients for the explanatory variables in Table 3 confirm the hypothesis that the higher the level of trust in society, the stronger the institutions, and therefore the more tolerant the population of the country is on average to the "tactics of petty foul", the institutions are significantly weak. From Table 3, it can be assumed that both coefficients for explanatory variables are significant.

As a result of a step-by-step selection of variables, one variable from each group of variables remained in the final model. The final model was obtained as a result of six stages of the step-by-step selection of variables, the statistical characteristics of which were previously given in Table 2.

Model Summary									
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate					
1	.661ª	.437	.347	.76436					
2	.661 ^b	.437	.361	.75587					
3	.656°	.430	.368	.75206					
4	.650 ^d	.422	.373	.74914					
5	.631°	.398	.361	.75636					
6	.611 ^ŕ	.373	.347	.76409					

Table 3. Results for the final regression model

Coefficients ^a										
Model		Unstandardize	d Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.				
		В	Std. Error	Beta						
6	(Constant)	-1.815	.745		-2.435	.019				
	Justifiable: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance	431	.170	288	-2.539	.014				
	How much you trust: People you know personally (% of people who trust)	3.724	.813	.519	4.580	.000				
a D	a Dependent Variable: Rule of Law									

Source: Author's calculations using the SPSS program.

It is important to point out that in the final regression model there was a variable describing trust in familiar people. The results of the study shown in the tables indicate very pragmatic statistical characteristics of the resulting model.

4.3. Stereotypes of behavior and wellbeing of countries relationship between behavioral assumptions and the level of trust in society

Behavioral assumptions and the level of trust determine the level of development of institutions, as well as countries, since effective institutions are one of the most important factors for the well-being of countries. On the basis of indicators characterizing the "petty foul tactics" and the level of trust in society, 7 stereotypes (clusters) of behavior were identified using cluster analysis.Within the framework of this study, the influence of behavioral assumptions and the level of trust on the well-being of countries was analyzed. In the study, the diversity of people's behavior was modeled using predefined stereotypes based on variables already used in this article. It is important to note that people's behavior is much more diverse than any stereotypes, nevertheless, an attempt was made in the study to identify clear stereotypes based on tolerance to "petty foul tactics" and trust in others and familiar people. For this purpose, a two-step method of cluster analysis1 was used, where the explanatory variables are the above variables. In this case, the original data contained in the World Value Survey was used. The total number of survey participants in all countries participating in the sixth stage of the research exceeded 80 thousand respondents. In turn, this means that the sample under study was quite large and representative.

As a result of cluster analysis based on the first seven variables of Table 1, the optimal division is the division of respondents into 7 clusters. When performing cluster analysis, as before, the first five variables are considered as continuous, and the variables characterizing the level of confidence as factors.

Table 4 shows the average values of continuous explanatory variables in each of the clusters obtained, and table 5 shows the percentage of respondents in clusters who chose the appropriate answer for each question about the level of trust in society.

Name –		Two-step Cluster Number							
		2	3	4	5	6	7		
Justifiable: Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled	1.389	4.376	2.531	2.278	6.039	2.297	2.367		
Justifiable: Avoiding a fare on public transport	1.346	4.191	2.367	1.963	6.190	2.097	2.266		
Justifiable: Stealing property	1.096	2.099	1.434	1.238	5.761	1.360	1.381		
Justifiable: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance	1.206	3.162	1.837	1.447	6.396	1.672	1.835		
Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	1.138	2.437	1.582	1.326	5.981	1.437	1.526		
Mean	1.235	3.253	1.950	1.650	6.073	1.773	1.875		

 Table 4. Results of cluster analysis for continuous variables

Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org and the author's calculations.

Behavioral Assumptions and the Level of Trust in Society as a Decisive Factor in the Existence of Strong Formal Institutions

	Two-step Cluster Number									
Name	1	2	3	4	5	6	7			
Meet needle can be trusted	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	27.0%	100.0%	100.0%			
most people can be trusted	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	97.8%	73.0%	0.0%	0.0%			
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	76.1%	29.8%	77.5%	0.0%			
How much you trust: People you	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.0%	0.0%	100.0%			
know personally	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	23.3%	22.5%	0.0%			
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	23.9%	14.0%	0.0%	0.0%			

Table 5. Results of cluster analysis for factors

The special characteristics of the clusters obtained are as follows: the 6th and 7th clusters are those clusters where there is a high degree of trust in both others and familiar people (in both clusters, 100% of respondents trust others, and respectively 78% and 100% trust familiar people). At the same time, these two clusters have a fairly low level of tolerance to "petty foul tactics". The third cluster consists of respondents who do not trust both others and familiar people and who have an average level of tolerance to "petty foul tactics". Clusters 1 and 2 generally coincide in the level of trust in others and acquaintances, at the same time they differ sharply in the level of tolerance to "petty foul tactics". The first cluster has the lowest level of tolerance compared to other clusters.

Analyzing the specifics of clusters, we have indicated that cluster No. 4 is more ambiguous, a characteristic feature of which is a very low level of trust in others, but a fairly high level of trust in familiar people. On the one hand, it may seem that this cluster is similar to cluster No. 1, but here the tolerance index for "petty foul tactics" is much higher than in the first cluster. If we talk about the fifth cluster, then it includes those respondents who have a sharply different level of tolerance to "petty foul tactics" and an average level of trust in acquaintances and others.

Thus, provided that if the hypothesis of this scientific study that a high level of trust and rejection of "petty foul tactics" are conditions for the well-being of countries is correct, then consequently, the more people adhere to behavioral stereotypes corresponding to clusters 1, 6 and 7, the higher the average level of well-being in these countries should be. Appendix 1 shows a table of countries with a breakdown of respondents by behavior patterns. The study also grouped countries by the total number of respondents who adhere to behavioral stereotypes corresponding to clusters 1, 6 and 7. As a result, we obtained a breakdown of countries where this amount is 1) higher than 70% (that is, more than 70% of respondents in this country are in clusters 1,6 and 7), 2) from 60% to 70% inclusive, 3) from 50% to 60% inclusive, 4) from 40% to 50% inclusive, 5) less than 40%. The average value of the Human Development Index (HDI) was calculated for each group of countries. The results are shown in Figure 4.



Figure 4. The average value of the Human Development Index for groups of countries compiled on the basis of behavior stereotypes.

Figure 4 shows that those countries where behavioral assumptions based on rejection of "petty foul tactics" and a high level of trust between people prevail have, on average, a much higher level of well-being. Moreover, the higher the percentage of respondents belonging to clusters 1, 6 and 7 according to their behavioral assumptions and level of trust, the higher the level of well-being. Thus, our hypothesis, formed at the beginning of this part of the article, was fully confirmed.

5. Conclusion

The key conclusion of the article is the thesis that the economic development of the country as a whole is possible only in the presence of adequate formal institutions, which are based on the stereotypes of behavior accepted in society. We believe that the concept of a "rational person", which has become established in economic theory, does not allow us to study in depth the influence of behavioral assumptions and the level of trust on the economic components of human development. We also believe that issues related to behavioral assumptions, as well as their impact on the institutional and economic development of countries, should proceed from a broader understanding of people's behavior. In this article, the term "petty foul tactics" was used as one of the possible behavioral assumptions that really affect both institutional and macroeconomic processes in society.

in Empirically, this study, it was demonstrated that the "accepted" behavioral assumptions in the country affect the level of trust in society. The latter, as we believe, determines the possibilities largely of functioning of effective formal institutions. Generally speaking, institutions seem to us to be a kind of contract between members of society, about what rules society lives by and how these rules adapt in life. We assume that this agreement can proceed from two principles: the principle of mutual trust and the principle of coercion. In our opinion, under the conditions of the relationship between the principle of mutual trust and the principle of coercion, it is possible to create effective formal institutions. Researcher Harutyunyan (2017) proved that theoretically there can

be institutions based only on the principle of coercion, at the same time they cannot be effective, at least due to high transaction costs. In the study, we also came to the conclusion that effective institutions in the country have a better chance of existence if the level of trust in society is high, and the level of tolerance to "petty foul tactics" is significantly low.

We came to the above-mentioned result based on the analysis of a sample of more than 80,000 respondents of the World Value Survey. It is important to note the thesis that countries where behavioral presets predominate, based on a high indicator of trust and/or a low level of tolerance to "petty foul tactics", can boast on average a much higher level of the human development index. This result, in our opinion, can be explained by the well-known theory of the "track effect" in institutional economics (Vergne, Durand, 2010), which proceeds from the fact that the current trends in the development of the country tend to persist in the long term. Of course, attracting investments, changing the macroeconomic policy of the state, carrying out structural reforms can affect the dynamics and quality of the country's economic development in the short term, at the same time, to reach a new level of development, it is important to change the behavioral presets of citizens, which is a long-term and complex task that requires much refined methods of policy formation.

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Behavioral Assumptions and the Level of Trust in Society as a Decisive Factor in the Existence of Strong Formal Institutions

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Behavioral Assumptions and the Level of Trust in Society as a Decisive Factor in the Existence of Strong Formal Institutions

Appendix 1

Name	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Algeria	9.6%	21.3%	14.1%	18.4%	26.7%	5.7%	4.2%
Argentina	21.3%	16.7%	10.4%	23.2%	6.8%	11.2%	10.5%
Armenia	40.4%	13.0%	15.8%	18.4%	3.3%	4.5%	4.7%
Australia	22.7%	6.6%	2.0%	12.1%	2.2%	29.7%	24.7%
Azerbaijan	27.4%	5.3%	14.5%	36.3%	2.7%	7.6%	6.2%
Belarus	18.9%	23.4%	9.7%	8.2%	9.7%	9.5%	20.7%
Brazil	27.5%	15.4%	23.7%	18.1%	9.7%	2.4%	3.3%
Chile	28.2%	16.9%	19.5%	18.6%	3.8%	6.0%	7.1%
China	11.1%	8.4%	8.1%	4.8%	7.1%	19.5%	40.9%
Colombia	24.7%	16.9%	29.3%	20.5%	4.9%	1.8%	1.9%
Cyprus	41.2%	10.3%	13.4%	23.1%	4.0%	4.9%	3.1%
Ecuador	19.9%	11.3%	36.5%	17.6%	9.1%	3.3%	2.3%
Egypt	17.2%	11.2%	3.1%	41.3%	7.6%	15.1%	4.5%
Estonia	22.1%	19.2%	6.5%	9.4%	4.1%	15.4%	23.4%
Georgia	52.1%	6.8%	17.4%	14.5%	.4%	3.9%	4.8%
Ghana	31.1%	9.6%	30.1%	22.1%	2.6%	2.0%	2.4%
India	24.4%	8.7%	14.0%	22.3%	14.9%	8.3%	7.3%
Iraq	16.4%	17.3%	13.9%	15.0%	6.5%	11.3%	19.5%
Japan	37.5%	4.8%	10.9%	6.2%	1.7%	9.7%	29.2%
Jordan	33.5%	9.3%	12.2%	29.1%	3.6%	6.2%	6.1%
Kazakhstan	16.8%	15.2%	9.5%	11.7%	13.0%	13.7%	20.1%
Kuwait	16.7%	11.2%	7.1%	22.7%	18.4%	15.4%	8.5%
Kyrgyzstan	15.0%	13.1%	15.3%	13.6%	13.6%	13.7%	15.8%
Lebanon	18.9%	17.1%	13.8%	21.2%	22.3%	3.6%	3.0%
Malaysia	33.4%	16.5%	14.1%	14.3%	16.3%	2.8%	2.7%
Mexico	10.3%	17.0%	28.3%	20.2%	14.6%	5.4%	4.2%
Morocco	36.1%	7.8%	14.0%	26.7%	3.5%	6.3%	5.5%
Netherlands	15.6%	4.2%	6.9%	4.2%	2.0%	18.0%	49.0%
Nigeria	24.0%	11.9%	23.0%	19.7%	8.4%	6.3%	6.7%
Pakistan	25.6%	6.0%	18.4%	24.6%	5.6%	10.4%	9.4%
Peru	14.5%	15.7%	32.8%	22.9%	7.9%	4.1%	2.2%
Philippines	10.9%	28.9%	13.9%	10.4%	34.4%	.8%	.8%
Poland	38.1%	22.1%	9.2%	5.1%	3.1%	3.1%	19.2%
Romania	32.7%	7.6%	34.6%	14.4%	4.1%	2.4%	4.1%

Name	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Russia	20.2%	21.6%	10.7%	11.3%	12.2%	8.5%	15.5%
Rwanda	28.2%	5.2%	18.4%	29.9%	2.7%	8.4%	7.2%
Singapore	20.0%	15.6%	4.3%	13.3%	16.0%	13.3%	17.4%
Slovenia	33.3%	15.5%	13.4%	14.3%	3.6%	8.4%	11.4%
South Africa	14.3%	9.2%	8.2%	11.4%	43.8%	6.3%	6.9%
South Korea	29.5%	17.5%	11.3%	9.5%	3.7%	8.9%	19.6%
Spain	28.6%	11.8%	8.3%	29.1%	3.4%	10.1%	8.7%
Sweden	12.8%	9.3%	1.0%	7.7%	7.4%	35.3%	26.6%
Taiwan	27.8%	20.8%	5.6%	13.1%	3.3%	13.4%	16.0%
Thailand	22.2%	11.9%	15.5%	16.1%	5.3%	14.2%	14.8%
Trinidad and Tobago	47.8%	9.6%	16.8%	21.5%	1.2%	1.7%	1.4%
Turkey	37.5%	4.4%	14.2%	30.4%	2.2%	6.0%	5.2%
Ukraine	24.4%	24.4%	9.5%	11.2%	8.5%	8.1%	13.8%
United States	27.3%	11.7%	3.4%	14.0%	7.0%	17.9%	18.7%
Uruguay	28.6%	8.9%	15.9%	28.1%	5.0%	6.8%	6.7%
Uzbekistan	23.5%	11.1%	16.7%	27.9%	7.6%	7.6%	5.6%
Yemen	16.3%	9.2%	16.1%	13.9%	7.3%	16.8%	20.4%
Zimbabwe	28.7%	18.0%	25.1%	13.3%	9.3%	3.3%	2.3%
Total	24.4%	12.7%	14.3%	17.4%	10.0%	9.3%	11.8%